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APPELLANTS1 PETITION FOR REHEARING 
Appellants, Michael C. Thompson and Bruce A. Conklin, 
petition this Court for a Rehearing for the reason that this 
Court has misapprehended Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-911 et: seq. 
(1985) (Utah Antitrust Act) and the good faith exception to the 
exclusionary rule as it applies to the facts of this case. 
ARGUMENT 
APPELLANTS1 ANTITRUST CONVICTIONS SHOULD BE REVERSED 
This Court's modified definition of lfgroup boycott" is in 
contravention of the expressed legislative intent that the Utah 
Antitrust Act is to be construed in accordance with "interpre-
tations given by the federal courts to comparable federal anti-
trust statutes Utah Code Ann.§ 76-10-926 (1985). 
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As this Court noted, the classic definition of flper se group 
boycott" is a situation in which "two or more competitors on the 
same level of the market structure agree to eliminate a target 
horizontal competitor by combining to deny the target of elements 
needed in order to compete." Opinion at 9. 
This Court also recognized that the instant case does not 
present the classic per se group boycott situation. Opinion at 
11. This Court turned away from the established group boycott 
definition and analysis and replaced it with a much broader 
approach. Appellants assert that there is no apparent 
legislative intent to modify the traditional definition of group 
boycott. Moreover, Appellants agree with Judge Orme's dissent 
that even under this Court's definition no group boycott existed 
in this case. 
This Court adopted the following definition of group boy-
cott: "a method of pressuring a party with whom one has a 
dispute by withholding, or enlisting others to withhold, patron-
age or services from the target." Opinion at 11-12. Appellants 
had no dispute with any party, either horizontally or vertically. 
No patronage or services were withheld, and no target existed. 
This Court apparently grouped all entities offering the services 
of security guards as the "target." Such a relationship is 
inimical to the term "target," which usually denotes "a person or 
business against which competitive aim is taken . . . ." Reaemco 
Inc. v. Allegheny Airlines, 496 F. Supp. 546, 552 (D.C.N.Y. 
1980). Under the theory that all security companies were the 
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target of the alleged boycott, any such (company in existence at 
the time could bring an action against Appellants for treble 
damages. Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-919 (1985). Certainly, such a 
result is not the intent of this Court. 
This Court observed that several cases recognize per se 
group boycotts between a "single horizontal competitor and a 
vertically related company.11 Opinion at 12. Significantly, in 
each case cited (Cascade Cabinet Co. v. Western Cabinet Millwork, 
710 F.2d 1366 (9th Cir. 1983); Corn-Tel, Inc. v. DuKane Corp., 669 
F.2d 404 (6th Cir. 1982); Corey v. Look, 641 F.2d 32 (1st Cir. 
1981)) there was a specific identifiableientity which had been 
singled out as the "target11 of the alleged boycotts. Appellants 
urge that the lack of any such target in the present case pre-
cludes the finding of a group boycott under this Court's defini-
tion, as well as under the traditional definition. 
As explained by Judge Orme, commercial bribery is an offense 
which has been given its own punishment by the state legislature 
under Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-508 (1973). No legislative policy 
requires or provides that when such a bribe is offered to secure 
a contract, it results in a violation of the Utah Antitrust Act 
as well. A mere exclusive dealing arrangement violates neither 
federal nor state antitrust Law. Two Cities Sport Service, Inc. 
v. Charles 0. Finley & Co., 676 F.2d 1291,, 1304 n.9 (9th Cir. 
1982). 
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Appellants further urge that this Court mistakenly con-
sidered Utah Power & Light to be in and of itself the relevant 
market for purposes of group boycott analysis. While it is true 
that Utah Power & Light is the largest single employer of 
security services in Utah, it is neither the only such employer 
nor does it employ a majority of the area's security personnel. 
The market for security services is worldwide. The fact that 
Appellants were the only competitors to provide security services 
for Utah Power & Light for a period of time cannot rise to 
antitrust activity, even assuming the contract was obtained as a 
result of commercial bribery. 
No evidence in this case suggests a potential for a re-
straint of trade in any significant market. If this Court 
declines a reconsideration of its opinion, a precedent will be 
set allowing an antitrust action in virtually any commercial 
bribery scenario. 
This Court's opinion will have the additional effect of 
introducing doubt and uncertainty into the Utah Antitrust Act. 
The legislature apparently attempted to eliminate such uncer-
tainty by particularly describing only four unlawful acts. See 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-920 (1985). The additional requirement of 
specific anticompetitive intent was correctly recognized by Judge 
Orme as a legislative attempt to narrow the scope of the group 
boycott crime. This requirement would avoid a conviction where a 
boycott exists without anticompetitive intent. This analysis 
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conforms to the longstanding rule that criminal statutes should 
be strictly construed. United States v. Wiltberger, 5 U.S. 76, 
95 (1820). This Court's opinion not only expands the scope of 
the group boycott crime but also blurs the bright line between 
criminal and noncriminal conduct drawn in the Utah Antitrust Act. 
EVIDENCED OBTAINED PURSUANT TO THE SECRET 
INVESTIGATION SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUPPRESSED 
On March 31, 1988, the Utah Supreme Court handed down its 
decision in In the Matter of a Criminal Investigation, Supreme 
Court Docket No. 20268 (hereinafter referred to as the Inves-
tigation Case). As this Court is aware, that case reviewed the 
propriety of the investigation which produced the evidence 
against the Appellant's in the case at bar. The Supreme Court 
found that the Subpoena Powers Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 77-22-1 to 
-3, was not unconstitutional on its face. However, the Supreme 
Court determined that the Subpoena Powers Act was unconsti-
tutionally applied in the investigation of these Appellants. 
Of great significance to this Petition for Rehearing is the 
fact that the Attorney General conceded that the Subpoena Powers 
Act was unconstitutionally applied. Investigation Case at 8. 
In order for the Subpoena Powers Act to be constitutional, 
the Supreme Court required that the following procedural guide-
lines be followed: The investigation may be approved only after 
the district court has made an objective determination that good 
cause has been shown. Each individual subpoena may be issued 
TMP2/lbr-4/l 
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only after the investigating attorney has made a good faith 
determination that the testimony or other evidence being sought 
is reasonably relevant to the authorized investigation. Subpoe-
naed persons must be afforded an opportunity to challenge the 
subpoena at some time prior to compliance. The authorizing court 
has the power to entertain motions to quash and must quash any 
individual subpoena that does not meet an objective standard of 
reasonableness. Each witness subpoenaed must be notified (1) of 
the general subject matter of the investigation, (2) of the exis-
tence and nature of the privilege against self-incrimination, (3) 
that any information provided may be used against the witness in 
a criminal proceeding, (4) of the right to have counsel present, 
and (5) whether the witness is a target of the criminal inves-
tigation. All investigations must be fully documented and all 
such documentation must be maintained by the authorizing court. 
The prosecutor may not have a secrecy order with respect to the 
entire investigation but must go to the court for an individual 
secrecy order with regard to each individual interrogation. 
Investigation Case at 15, 23, 30, 34. 
As noted, the Utah Supreme Court determined that the inves-
tigation conducted by the State's attorney in this case was 
unconstitutional. Specifically, the Court found that each 
subpoena issued represented that it had been authorized by order 
of the district court and that disobedience to the subpoena was 
punishable by contempt of court. Since the subpoenas had not 
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been individually authorized and because contempt of court is a 
multi-step process, the Supreme Court held that the representa-
tions on the subpoenas were misstatements which may have "improp-
erly discouraged the recipients from challenging the subpoenas." 
Investigation Case at 38. The Court further observed that "to the 
extent that these misrepresentations discouraged Respondents or 
other subpoenaed parties from exercising their right to challenge 
the subpoenas, they denied rights guaranteed by the Act and by 
the Fourth Amendment." Investigation Case at 39. 
The Court also noted that the Attorney General failed to 
notify the Appellants prior to interrogation "of the general 
nature and scope of the investigation and of the right to exer-
cise the privilege against self-incrimination. These failures 
violated Respondent's State and Federal constitutional privileges 
against self-incrimination." Investigation Case at 39. 
Additionally, the Court held that the secrecy provisions of 
the Subpoena Powers Act were applied too broadly inasmuch as the 
district court ordered that the good cause affidavit itself was a 
secret document. The Court observed that "to the extent that the 
concealment of the good cause statement impeded the challenge of 
subpoenas or interrogations, it operated to deny rights against 
unreasonable search and seizure." Investigation Case at 40. 
Practically all the evidence presented against the Appel-
lants at trial was obtained as the result of this investigation 
which the Supreme Court has held to be unconstitutional. 
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Appellants are aware that this Court has indicated that the 
evidence was admissible regardless of the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in the Investigation Case, Opinion at 6, However, Appel-
lants believe that this Court has overlooked a vital distinction 
between the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule as it 
applies in the typical case of a police officer's good faith 
reliance on a search warrant and the very different scenario 
presented in the case at bar. 
This Court correctly observed that under United States v. 
Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984), evidence need not be excluded where 
the police officer acts in objectively reasonable reliance on an 
invalid search warrant. Opinion at 4. Similarly, this Court 
pointed out that under the analysis of Illinois v. Krull, 107 S. 
Ct. 1160 (1987), an officer's warrantless search in reasonable 
reliance on a statute does not require exclusion of evidence even 
where the statute is later held unconstitutional. 
However, the rationale behind Krull is not applicable to the 
instant case. In Krull, the Court observed that where an officer 
acts in objectively reasonable reliance on a statute which is 
held unconstitutional, the exclusion of evidence produces no 
deterrent effect on officer behavior. 
The Court here is not dealing with a police officer but 
rather with experienced lawyers employed by the Attorney 
General's Office. While an officer may not be expected to 
analyze the constitutionality of a statute or the propriety of a 
-9-
TMP2/lbr-4/l 
warrant, a prosecutor must be expected to engage in such an 
analysis. Further, the Court's assumption that the Attorney 
General's Office acted in good faith objective reliance on the 
statute impermissibly shifts the burden of showing lack of good 
faith to the Appellants. Such a shift of burden is one of the 
reasons Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-12 was stricken down. State v. 
Mendoza, 748 P.2d 181, 186 (Utah 1987). 
Finally, the admission of the Attorney General that the 
Subpoena Powers Act was unconstitutionally applied flies in the 
face of the assumption that the Attorney General's conduct was 
objectively reasonable. The same office which utilized the 
Subpoena Powers Act has conceded that its application of the Act 
was constitutionally impermissible. This fact alone demands that 
the convictions be reversed for failure to suppress the evidence 
illegally obtained. 
CONCLUSION 
The issues before this Court are of no small importance and 
require a reconsideration of the premises for the Court's deci-
sion and a review of its consequences. Therefore, Appellants 
respectfully request that this Court grant the Petition for 
Rehearing. 
The undersigned certifies that this Petition is brought in 
good faith and not for the purpose of delay. 
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DATED this day of April, 1988. 
Respectfully submitted, 
SESSIONS & MOORE 
JOHN F. CLARK 
Attorney for Appellants-Petitioners 
CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY 
I certify that on this 6th day of April, 1988 I caused four 
copies of Appellants' Petition for Rehearing to be Hand-Delivered 
to the office of the Utah Attorney General. 
John F. Clark 
Attorney for Appellants-Petitioners 
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